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I 
INTRODUCTION 
From a theoretical perspective, there are many reasons why robust land 
markets might fail to develop in any given economy. Several of these are directly 
related to law: property rights might not be secure enough to facilitate effective 
market exchange; the law might ban certain forms of transactions outright, or at 
least significantly encumber them; and so on. But even if these explanations are 
fully coherent and empirically verifiable, a committed social scientist would still 
likely want to go deeper: how did these anti-market legal institutions develop in 
the first place? Here, too, there are a number of possibilities. For example: under 
some circumstances, especially when the rich enjoy strong sociopolitical 
dominance, free exchange might result in snowballing wealth inequality, which 
the state might want to combat.1 Alternatively, robust land markets might 
damage the interests of some politically powerful segments of society, which then 
lobby effectively to curb them.2 In another possible scenario, information 
technologies and social capital are at sufficiently low levels that widespread 
market exchange could lead to massive amounts of confusion and potential 
fraud.3 
When it comes to pre-industrial, early modern societies, however, a large 
volume of academic studies, ranging from the antiquated to the very recent, 
coalesce around a theory that is qualitatively different from those raised in the 
previous paragraph. These studies argue that the normative social belief that land 
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1.  See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 571–73 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2014) (arguing that growing wealth inequality is a natural consequence of capitalism, 
and proposing taxation-based measures to combat it). 
2. In many ways, this was what the English landed aristocracy did after the later eighteenth century 
by reviving entails and limiting the ability of creditors to seize collateralized land. See generally ALAN 
HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1966); Claire Priest, Creating an American Property 
Law: Alienability and Its Limits in American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385 (2006). 
3.  See, e.g., Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A
Cross-Country Investigation, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1251 (1997) (detailing the impact of low social trust and/or 
high information costs on property rights and their transfer). 
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is alienable—the very notion that selling land is morally permissible—is a modern 
phenomenon that only arises with the advent of a commercial society.4 
Traditional societies, the argument commonly goes, operated under “moral 
economies” in which both the selling and buying of land, for reasons ranging from 
protection of the economically disadvantaged to ancestor worship to village 
solidarity, was seen as a serious moral offense.5 Correspondingly, these societies 
developed legal and customary institutions to ban, or at least encumber, land-
selling. Therefore, moral factors did not merely influence or affect land markets, 
but rather the very act of buying and selling land was substantially moralized. 
There were, in other words, moral economies in land. 
Often underlying such arguments is the assumption—sometimes unstated—
that early modern farmers were less economically rational than their modern 
peers.6 That is, they were less keen on maximizing the economic value of their 
land and allowed internalized moral factors to interfere with the management of 
their most important economic asset. Some go so far as to argue that the moral 
condemnation of land alienation stemmed precisely from the economic 
importance of land in pre-industrial societies. This overwhelming economic 
significance psychologically prevented rural households from even-headedly 
considering market options that might, over the long run, have enhanced the 
overall welfare gains from agriculture. 
The advent of modern commercialization and industrialization presumably 
dismantled most of these moral economies. This was not merely a matter of 
dismantling stable, closely-knit communities and introducing higher levels of 
demographic mobility, it involved a fundamental moral shift that, for better or 
worse, was then enshrined in legal institutions and implemented in everyday 
economic life.7 Land no longer had any special moral significance. Instead, it 
 
 4.  This narrative has been told in many forms, and in studies of many regions.  See, for example, 
WILLIAM JAMES BOOTH, HOUSEHOLDS: ON THE MORAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE ECONOMY (1993) 
(discussing the intellectual history behind capitalist conceptions of the household); THOMAS M. BUOYE, 
MANSLAUGHTER, MARKETS, AND MORAL ECONOMY: VIOLENT DISPUTES OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS 
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CHINA 94 (2000) (discussing the supposed decline of “moral economies” in 
Eighteenth Century China); PHILIP C. C. HUANG, CODE, CUSTOM, AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN CHINA: 
THE QING AND THE REPUBLIC COMPARED 74 (2001) (discussing moral prohibitions on land alienation 
in the Nineteenth Century Chinese economy); KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (1957) (arguing that the decline of moral economies 
was a central feature of modern history across the globe); JAMES C. SCOTT, THE MORAL ECONOMY OF 
THE PEASANT: REBELLION AND SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (1976) (discussing the functioning 
and eventual decline of moral economies in Southeast Asia); E.P. THOMPSON, CUSTOMS IN COMMON 
97–184 (1993) (discussing moral economies in early modern and modern England); CHARLES TRIPP, 
ISLAM AND THE MORAL ECONOMY: THE CHALLENGE OF CAPITALISM (2006) (discussing the erosion 
of moral economies in the Middle East); STEPHEN VLASTOS, PEASANT PROTESTS AND UPRISINGS IN 
TOKUGAWA JAPAN (1990) (discussing the role of moral economies in Japanese peasant uprisings).  
 5.  See sources cited supra note 4. 
 6.  See generally Donald N. McCloskey, Book Review, 89 J. POL. ECON. 837 (1981) (summarizing 
and critiquing this concept). 
 7.  See sources cited supra note 4; see also, William James Booth, On the Idea of the Moral 
Economy, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 653 (1994) (analyzing the character of modern and premarket societies, 
and the normative standing of the market). 
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began to be treated like any other market commodity, to be used and disposed 
of in the most economically profitable manner. 
Through the years, this moral economy thesis has experienced multiple 
rounds of often-vigorous opposition. Naturally, the primary pushback was 
against the notion of a modern transition away from pre-commercial morality. 
Despite the same underlying premise, this critique came in two very different 
flavors. First, and perhaps more influentially, a significant number of critics have 
argued that early modern economies adopted a highly rational—for the most 
part, wealth-maximizing—approach towards property rights, and particularly 
towards the alienability of land.8 These economies were not encumbered by any 
moral notion of land inalienability. When their legal institutions limited 
alienability, it was generally for economically pragmatic reasons, not moral ones. 
Second, some critics argue quite the opposite. Instead, it is the modern end of the 
moral economy narrative that needs revision. Human economies have never fully 
shed themselves of their moral nature, and the notion that modern market 
economies are somehow amoral is deeply flawed.9 Rather than moving from a 
moral economy to a market-based one, we have simply shifted between different 
kinds of moral economies. In summary, the first line of critique argues that both 
modern and pre-modern economies tend to be pragmatically rational, whereas 
the second argues that both tend to be moral. 
Despite these attacks, the moral economy thesis has enjoyed remarkable 
longevity in a number of fields and disciplines. In legal theory, for example, the 
notion of relative inalienability of land as both a pre-modern and moral 
phenomenon has made appearances, albeit controversial ones, in major articles 
on property and contract. Most famously, Guido Calabresi and Douglas 
Melamed’s canonical article on property and liability rules suggests that 
“nonmonetizability is characteristic of one category of external costs which, as a 
practical matter, seems frequently to lead us to rules of inalienability. Such 
external costs are often called moralisms.”10 These historical arguments are not 
without their normative counterparts. For example, Margaret Radin has argued 
that the inalienability of certain kinds of property, including land, may be justified 
under certain notions of human flourishing and morality.11 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the impact of the moral economy thesis is particularly 
visible—and durable—in certain subfields of legal and social history. In Chinese 
 
 8.  See McCloskey, supra note 6 (discussing the economic rationality of villagers choosing crops in 
Vietnam); see also infra parts II and III (summarizing a large amount of this literature). 
 9.  See, e.g., Thomas Clay Arnold, Rethinking Moral Economy, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85 (2001) 
(illustrating the conception of a moral economy based on social goods through water politics in the 
American West). 
 10.  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111–12 (1972). 
 11.  See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) 
(offering an alternative justification for market-inalienability that relates it to an ideal of human 
flourishing); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (arguing for 
an intuitive view of property and personhood). 
ZHANG_FORMATTED_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE) 2/22/2017  3:55 PM 
110 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 80: 107 
legal history, for example, the idea that there existed a stage where farmers had 
some sort of special moral attachment to land significantly influences even those 
studies that claim nominal opposition to at least some version of it.12 In Southeast 
Asian and Middle Eastern history, such ideas—driven in large part by 
ethnographic studies of low-income rural communities and local religion—are 
arguably even more influential, and enjoy significant currency to this day.13 
This article approaches these issues from both a broad historical angle and a 
theoretical one. Part II—the empirical core of the article—focuses on the Chinese 
economy and asks whether, at any point in its documented history, there is any 
substantial evidence of moral economies in land. The answer is most likely no. 
Part III surveys a number of debates over land markets and peasant rationality 
in other parts of global history, covering England, Japan, and parts of Southeast 
Asia. Although some of these debates remain inconclusive, there tend to be 
serious analytical defects in the way that moral economy narratives have been 
argued for, lending credence to their opponents. 
Part IV examines the theoretical implications of these historical surveys. In 
particular, it asks whether a potential empirical rejection of the moral economy 
thesis within the context of historical land markets would necessarily imply an 
across-the-board rejection of any moral economy–based theory of property or 
contract. It argues that early modern land markets are a particularly unfriendly 
forum for moral economy theories. Moral economy proponents suggest that the 
special economic importance of land in pre-modern societies infused 
landownership with special moral significance.14 However, this logic is precisely 
backwards: the more economically important land is, the less likely it can coexist 
with moral condemnation of land selling. The more crucial land is to economic 
livelihood, the greater the pressure to maximize its material value and, therefore, 
the less room there is for systemic moralization. 
This does not mean, however, that high levels of economic significance 
necessarily preclude the institutional inalienability of land. Quite the opposite: 
when landed agriculture is the primary form of economic production, many social 
groups and classes will often have strong material—rather than moral—
incentives to oppose free alienability of land. If they are sufficiently powerful, 
they can impose legal or customary constraints against land alienation that 
protect their self-interest. In fact, this is exactly what occurred across large 
swathes of Chinese history. Groups at both ends of the social spectrum, ranging 
from titled aristocrats to rural smallholders, attempted, at various points in time, 
to institutionally limit the marketability of land and some succeeded in 
 
 12.  See infra part II. 
 13.  See, e.g., Timothy Gorman, Moral Economy and the Upper Peasant: The Dynamics of Land 
Privatization in the Mekong Delta, 14 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 501, 501 (2014) (examining how people 
mobilize around notions of distributive justice, or moral economies, through a Mekong Delta case study). 
 14.  See, e.g., HUANG, supra note 4, at 71 (characterizing Qing Dynasty land systems as driven by “a 
survival ethic”). 
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spectacular fashion.15 As a legal matter, pre-industrial societies often 
encumbered land alienation,16 but perhaps rarely for moral reasons. 
In other words, early modern land markets were arguably among the places 
where one would least expect to find significant moral economies at work. 
Consequently, even if there are no major historical examples of moral concerns 
limiting land alienability, there is little reason to believe that such concerns 
cannot exert powerful influence over other parts of social life. In fact, social 
culture and morality may very well have exerted indirect influence over property 
institutions even if land use and alienability themselves were not substantially 
moralized. 
A few examples of this process are summarized in Part V. Part V also 
considers whether these theoretical claims have any role to play in our 
understanding of contemporary legal systems. One curious consequence of 
multiple industrial revolutions and ongoing global market integration is that in 
many developing countries land is no longer quite as critical an economic 
resource as it used to be. At the same time, few would deny that, in most major 
economies, land is transferred more freely and regularly today than it was in the 
early modern era. Is this a problem for the theoretical framework outlined in Part 
IV? Though the answer is no, a closer look at these issues yields additional 
insights into the theoretical underpinnings of moral economy theories. 
II 
A LONGUE DUREE HISTORY OF CHINESE LAND MARKETS 
Historians have argued about the presence of moral economies in historical 
Chinese land markets for several decades now, but have yet to reach any firm 
conclusion. What progress has been made demonstrates that, if moral economies 
truly burdened Chinese land markets, they did not do so nearly as recently as we 
once imagined. There is reasonably good evidence to suggest that, at least from 
the eighteenth century onwards, most rural households approached land selling 
from a largely utilitarian and materialistic perspective.17 Wealth maximization, 
rather than personal or social morality, seemed to have been the predominant 
concern. However, if this was the case for the last two centuries or so of pre–
People’s Republic history, is there any real reason, empirical or theoretical, to 
think that early eras were fundamentally different? 
To answer this question, at least preliminarily, it is probably easier to work 
backwards in time, starting with a summary of what is known about the later Qing 
and Republic, and then project the analytical inquiries to earlier periods and 
dynasties. Though this will necessarily be an extremely broad summary, it still 
demonstrates that there is little reason to believe in the existence of moral 
economies in early modern China, given the state of the secondary literature. 
 
 15.  See discussion infra part II. 
 16.  See discussion infra part III. 
 17.  See discussion infra pp. 116–21. 
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Frankly, it is rather difficult to imagine how substantive arguments to the 
contrary could be made. 
The natural starting point is the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—the 
period immediately preceding the People’s Republic—where the historical 
evidence is most robust. Writing in the early 1980s, the highly influential 
economic and legal historian Philip Huang sought to position his new manuscript 
on the rural economy of Qing and Republican North China as a revision to what 
he considered to be overly broad and general moral economy narratives of 
peasant societies.18 Such narratives, he argued, “overestimate[d] the role that 
moral constraints played” even in pre-modern economies.19 Correspondingly, he 
attempted to portray the institutional limitations on land alienation that one 
commonly observes in pre-1949 Chinese customary law as, for the most part, 
utilitarian reactions against an involutionary subsistence economy. To be fair, this 
was not one of the central pillars of the book, which never quite commits itself to 
any concrete theory of how these institutional limitations were created and 
sustained. By the time Huang turned his full attention to legal history in the 
1990s, he adopted a position that was surprisingly similar to the moral economy 
narratives he had previously critiqued. He argued that many of the institutional 
problems with pre-1949 land markets were products of “precommercial ideals of 
permanence in landholding,” which discouraged farmers from alienating their 
land, and set up transactional instruments in ways that made it enormously 
difficult for prospective buyers to permanently acquire land.20 
This claim soon came under attack from several angles. First, a number of 
economic and institutional histories that emerged in the later 2000s directly 
targeted Huang’s characterization of late Qing and Republican property customs 
as pre-commercial, arguing instead that they both allowed and, in fact, facilitated 
efficient land alienability.21 Second, several social histories, particularly a 2000 
manuscript by Thomas Buoye, claimed that, by at least the mid to late Qing, 
social attitudes towards land had become significantly commoditized: most 
households seemed to treat land like any other economic resource—alienable so 
long as the price and circumstances were right—with scant evidence, if any, of 
any substantial moral economies.22 Third, some surveying the field from a more 
theoretical and perhaps distant perspective questioned whether “precommercial 
ideals of permanence in landholding” could substantively coexist with a growing 
body of economic research that portrayed the Qing farmer as aggressively wealth 
maximizing, particularly in the context of land use and management.23 In other 
 
 18.  PHILIP C.C. HUANG, THE PEASANT ECONOMY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NORTH CHINA 
(1985). 
 19.  Id. at 23. 
 20.  HUANG, supra note 4, at 74; see also MELISSA MACAULEY, SOCIAL POWER AND LEGAL 
CULTURE: LITIGATION MASTERS IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 234 (1998) (developing a similar claim). 
 21.  See, e.g., Kenneth Pomeranz, Land Markets in Late Imperial and Republican China, 23 
CONTINUITY & CHANGE 101 (2008). 
 22.  BUOYE, supra note 4. 
 23.  See generally Taisu Zhang, Social Hierarchies and the Formation of Customary Property Law in 
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words, if there is strong evidence that Qing farmers were encumbered by moral 
economies in most other aspects of land use, why should market alienation be 
any different? 
Before delving deeper into these questions, a quick outline of these debate-
triggering property institutions will be useful. First, many villages across both 
North and South China had customary norms requiring potential land sellers to 
exhaust transactional options within their lineage (or village, in some cases) 
before offering it to outsiders. Essentially, they gave lineage members a right of 
first refusal. As a number of scholars have attempted to argue, this may have 
burdened the marketability of land.24 Second, most village customs allowed 
landholders who collateralized their land—usually under mortgage-like 
instruments known as “dian” sales (conditional sales)—to retain an essentially 
interminable right of redemption.25 If they so desired, debtors could redeem 
collateralized land many decades after the initial loan was issued. This created 
significant distortions in local land markets by making collateralized borrowing 
nearly risk-free to cash-strapped landholders. As a result, very few of them had 
any incentive to permanently sell land, which lead to extremely low volumes of 
permanent alienation, and, consequently, fewer economies of scale in the form 
of large, capitalist farms, which in turn led to lower levels of labor productivity.26 
Though it might be tempting to characterize these institutional features as 
reflections of pre-commercial ideals, as Huang and others have done, a more 
careful look at their underlying politics and actual economic effect strongly 
dispels that impression.27 Quite the contrary, dian institutions were the product 
of vigorous bargaining and negotiation by economically self-interested parties. 
There were coherent and powerful economic reasons for smallholders to desire 
interminable redeemability: essentially, the lack of well-paying forms of 
alternative employment in a pre-industrial economy meant that redeeming 
collateralized land was generally much more attractive than selling it outright.28 
Moreover, their ability to advance those interests via dian institutions stemmed 
directly from the amount of sociopolitical capital they possessed, rather than 
 
Pre–Industrial China and England, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 171 (2014) (summarizing and discussing relevant 
literature). 
 24. See PHILIP C.C. HUANG, THE PEASANT FAMILY AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE YANGZI 
DELTA, 1350–1988 107–08 (1990) (analyzing landownership in China by comparing the rights of topsoil 
and subsoil owners); SUCHETA MAZUMDAR, SUGAR AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: PEASANTS, 
TECHNOLOGY, AND THE WORLD MARKET 226–31 (1998) (discussing Qing law codes regarding land 
rights and small-peasant proprietorship); KENNETH POMERANZ, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: CHINA, 
EUROPE, AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD ECONOMY 70 (2000) (describing the practice of 
Yangzi Delta that those trying to sell or rent land had to offer it to kinfolk and or fellow villagers first).  
 25.  HUANG, supra note 4, at 74; MACAULEY, supra note 20. 
 26.  See generally Taisu Zhang, Property Rights in Land, Agricultural Capitalism, and the Relative 
Decline of Pre–Industrial China, 13 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 129 (2011) (exploring this phenomenon in 
greater detail). 
 27.  Zhang, supra note 23. 
 28.  Id. 
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from the moral sympathy and voluntary accommodation of wealthier creditors.29 
In other words, the creation and sustenance of dian institutions was primarily a 
utilitarian and political process, not a moral one. Moreover, it is not exactly 
accurate to characterize dian sales as a restraint against alienation. These sales 
simply maximized the control and freedom of the seller/debtor, who had the 
option of permanently selling his land, while taking away some control and 
freedom from the buyer/creditor. This is hardly the same as banning alienation 
per se. 
Lineage rights of first refusal are more easily characterized as true restraints 
against alienation. However, they too lend themselves to coherent political 
economy-based explanations. In small, closely-knit communities—the majority 
of pre-1949 Chinese villages—reluctance to allow outsiders to buy land is not 
necessarily a moral issue, but rather a utilitarian one. As theoretical papers have 
demonstrated, the presence of too many outsiders tends to erode the level of trust 
between community members, which in turn can have sharply negative 
consequences for the efficacy of self-governance and everyday economic 
transactions.30 This is more than merely an abstract conjecture: studies of village 
governance in North China indicate that villagers were strongly concerned about 
the political and economic consequences of outsider interference.31 As for sub-
village groups such as lineages and clans, the political calculus was likely even 
simpler: the clan as a whole derived at least some sociopolitical influence and 
status from its cumulative economic clout. Therefore, they had a fairly strong 
incentive to at least explore the possibility of keeping land within the family. 
Moreover, it seems unlikely that rights of first refusal were a significant 
burden on local land markets because they were, after all, rights of first refusal, 
not rights to veto sales. Beyond that, there were further reasons to doubt their 
broader economic significance. Importantly, most villages in South China and the 
Yangtze regions—where such norms were most common and tended to be 
relatively well enforced—were dominated by one or two major lineages.32 In 
other words, demanding that sellers first search within their own lineage did very 
little to limit the pool of realistic buyers because the lineage was so large. 
Individual landowners therefore had little incentive to resist such regulations. 
Indeed, they were very rarely the subject of litigation. For example, the 
Republican era archives of a Southern Zhejiang county court contain several  
 
 
 29.  Id.  
 30.  See Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2001) 
(describing how new social norms are created and advanced within societies); see also Jonathan Bendor 
& Piotr Swistak, The Evolution of Norms, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1493 (2001) (explaining social norms through 
evolutionary game theory). 
 31.  See, e.g., PRASENJIT DUARA, CULTURE, POWER, AND THE STATE: RURAL NORTH CHINA, 
1900-1942 (1988). 
 32.  See SUSAN NAQUIN & EVELYN S. RAWSKI, CHINESE SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
100–01 (1987) (discussing evolution of Qing society, economics, and culture in the eighteenth century); 
see also POMERANZ, supra note 24, at 72.  
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thousand cases concerning dian redemption, tenancy rights, and other land-
related issues, but none, or at most very few, about lineage rights of first refusal.33 
How do these observations affect the pre-commercial ideals debate outlined 
at the beginning of this part? They tend to agree with both Buoye’s argument 
that, by at least the mid-Qing, land was treated more as a commoditized economic 
resource than as a moral entity, and with the general observation that Qing and 
Republican farmers were quite aggressively wealth maximizing in land use and 
management.34 Dian redemption norms did indeed create distorted—depending 
on one’s notion of what is regular—local land markets in which the vast majority 
of land transactions were collateralized loans, rather than outright permanent 
sales, but these were active markets nonetheless. For example, according to 
Republican era surveys,  ten to thirty percent of North Chinese village land was 
usually under a dian sale at any given time.35 Lower Yangtze and South China 
land markets may have been, if anything, even more active, given the generally 
deeper levels of commercialization and market integration in those regions, and 
the much larger amounts of land contracts there that have survived to the present 
day.36 Moreover, the existence of distortionary property institutions was far more 
likely to have been the product of political economies than the product of moral 
ones.37 Huang was probably right that Chinese property institutions were rather 
hostile to the permanent buying and selling of land.38 Despite this, the leap to a 
moral economy–based explanation is likely unwarranted.  
Even so, the way that this debate unfolded is indicative of the enormous 
theoretical allure of moral economy narratives. Huang began by criticizing what 
he saw as an overly broad application of moral economy ideas to Chinese 
history.39 However, he eventually arrived at a more or less similar conclusion.40 
Buoye made a more spirited attempt to argue against the existence of significant 
moral economies in mid and late Qing land markets, but in the process also 
assumed that they existed in the early Qing, and that there was a transition at 
some point.41 This is the weakest point in his argument: there is no evidence—
whether in the book or elsewhere—that land markets functioned in a 
qualitatively different manner in the early Qing.42 Rather, the best current 
evidence suggests that basic property institutions, including those governing dian 
 
 33.  Longquan Dang’an Hebian Mulu (on file with author). 
 34.  See sources cited supra notes 21, 22. 
 35.  NAGANO AKIRA, ZHONGGUO TUDI ZHIDU DE YANJIU [RESEARCH ON CHINA’S LAND 
INSTITUTIONS] 121–23 (Qiang Wo trans., 2004). 
 36.  See, e.g., SHICANG QIYUE [SHICANG CONTRACTS] (Cao Shuji ed., Zhejiang Univ. Press 2010) 
(collecting some of the best preserved contracts from this region); see also QINGDAI NINGBO QIYUE 
WENSHU JIJIAO [QING CONTRACTS FROM NINGBO] (Wang Wanying ed., Tianjian Guji Press 2008). 
 37.  Zhang, supra note 23. 
 38.  HUANG, supra note 4, at 71, 74. 
 39.  HUANG, supra note 18, at 23. 
 40.  HUANG, supra note 4, at 71, 74. 
 41.  BUOYE, supra note 4. 
 42.  See David Faure, Book Review, 65 BULL. SCH. ORIENTAL & AFR. STUD. 621 (2002).  
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and permanent selling, were largely stable throughout the Qing, and likely 
extended back to the Ming (1368–1644). But, regardless of its empirical firmness, 
Buoye’s belief in a Qing transition from moral to commercial economy 
underscores the resiliency of the moral economy thesis. When scholars—at least, 
scholars in fields other than economics—come across evidence against it, the 
impulse is often not to dismiss the thesis altogether, but rather to push it back to 
an earlier era. In this particular case, the push extended back to the early Qing, 
but that turned out to be insufficient. How far back will this search extend before 
solid evidence of moral economies is found? 
One major difficulty with arguing for Ming, Yuan, or Song Dynasty moral 
economies, however, is that the availability of archival material begins to 
plummet once we move beyond the eighteenth century. The vast majority of 
existing land contracts and cases come from the Qing, and nearly all in-depth 
academic surveys of rural society were conducted in the early twentieth century.43 
County archives rarely contain material that reaches into the late Ming, much less 
earlier eras. As a result, moral economy narratives, like any other explanatory 
narrative about Ming social or economic trends, have a much more difficult time 
getting off the ground. It is no coincidence that the great majority of such 
narratives are situated in the Qing and Republic. Given the growing consensus 
that Qing land economies were not significantly moral, the basic standard of 
proof for any moral economy proponent should be, at the very least, to identify 
a robust reason why Ming land markets were substantively different—rather than 
merely assuming that pre-modern farmers had to have been less economically 
rational than modern ones. The lack of local archival material severely limits the 
range of possibilities. 
Studies of later Ming land markets do reveal a plethora of claims, some made 
in litigation filings, some in literati commentary, that landowners generally 
desired to keep ahold of ancestral land, and that losing it was an embarrassing 
and sad event.44 The problem is that such claims are even more plentiful in Qing 
archives.45 Yet, scholars have generally found no corroborating evidence of moral 
economies at work, and have instead found much evidence to the contrary. 
Making moral claims about land that had been held within the family for 
generations was an extremely common rhetorical move in virtually all 
 
 43.  Comparing the Ming collections of any county archive—if there are any—with the Qing 
collections will demonstrate the problem. 
 44.  See YANG GUOZHEN, MING QING TUDI QIYUE WENSHU YANJIU [RESEARCH ON LAND 
CONTRACTS IN THE MING AND QING] 279 (1988) (discussing the redemption of land sales in Ming and 
Qing archives); Kishimoto Mio, Ming Qing Shidai de “Zhaojia Huishu” Wenti [The Issue of “Zhaojia” 
and “Dian” Redemption in the Ming and Qing], in III-4 ZHONGGUO FAZHISHI KAOZHENG [EMPIRICAL 
STUDIES ON CHINESE LEGAL HISTORY] 423 (Terada Hiroaki ed., Zheng Minqin trans., 2003) (discussing 
the social history of “dian” redemption in the Ming and Qing); Yang Guozhen, Shilun Qingdai Minbei 
Minjian de Tudi Maimai [Discussing Land Transactions in Qing Northern Fujian], in 1 ZHONGGUOSHI 
YANJIU [STUDIES ON CHINESE HISTORY] 29 (1981) (discussing the redemption of land sales in Ming and 
Qing archives).  
 45.  See, e.g., MACAULEY, supra note 20 (discussing customary land transactions in Late Imperial 
Fujian); Kishimoto, supra note 44. 
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macroregions throughout the later Qing,46 but it did not seem to have much effect 
on property institutions. When, for example, smallholders wanted to reaffirm or 
enforce favorable dian redemption rules, they often had to do so with a political 
or social show-of-force, against sometimes bitter resistance by wealthier 
creditors.47 By and large, only those who had an otherwise powerful economic 
incentive to keep ancestral land made claims about its moral sanctity.48 Parties 
who had the opposite incentive—to purchase new properties—rarely employed 
such language, even in a negative fashion.49 Therefore, it was likely a primarily 
rhetorical tool, similar to the greatly exaggerated pleas of poverty and ignorance 
that litigants routinely made before local courts, rather than evidence of deep-
rooted moralization. But if this was the case during the Qing, is there any reason 
to think that similar claims made during the Ming should be interpreted 
differently? It seems unlikely. Quite the contrary, there is much circumstantial 
evidence from the mid-Ming that land markets were highly active, and that land 
selling was regarded as a commonplace event.50 A large collection of land 
contracts from South China survives from this era, the earliest such collection 
currently available.51 
Another potential argument for why the Ming—or at least the early Ming—
might be different is that there is evidence of an increase in land selling from the 
early Ming to mid-dynasty. For example, a wide array of sources suggest that the 
mid-Ming state was having much greater difficulty keeping its tax registers up-to-
date, strongly suggesting that a substantial increase in land-selling was taking 
place.52 Do these general trends make a case for the existence of moral economies 
in the early Ming? The straightforward theoretical answer is no: moral economies 
can, in theory, be broken up by commercialization, but the fact that one finds 
scant evidence of moral economies after a period of rapid commercialization is 
not a reason to believe that there were significant moral economies beforehand. 
The evidence of deepening commercialization in the mid-Ming merely suggests 
that early Ming land markets were less active, but illuminates nothing about the 
reason. 
There are at least two logically coherent and empirically attractive 
explanations for the transition that have nothing to do with moral economies. 
First, the early Ming state was considerably more hostile towards demographic 
 
 46.  See, e.g., MACAULEY, supra note 20; Kishimoto, supra note 44.  
 47.  Zhang, supra note 23. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See Pomeranz, supra note 21; Yang, supra note 44. 
 51.  Yang, supra note 44. A number of proverbs describing the increased frequency of land-selling 
also seem to gain popularity in this era. For example, the phrase “land changes ownership eight hundred 
times over a thousand years” originated in the Tang, but began to be referred to as a popular saying in 
the Ming. See, e.g., THE PRIEST HANSHAN DEQING [憨山德清法師], LONG CANG: MENG YOU JI 
[HIDING THE DRAGON: RECORDS OF DREAMWALKING] [龍藏:夢遊集], ch. 32 (1634) (referring to the 
phrase as a “popular saying”). 
 52.  See TIMOTHY BROOK, THE CONFUSIONS OF PLEASURE: COMMERCE AND CULTURE IN MING 
CHINA 63–64, 79, 95 (1998) (discussing inaccuracy of mid-Ming population statistics). 
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and labor mobility than mid-Ming governments. The founding emperor of the 
Ming, in particular, envisioned a society where rural households neither migrated 
nor changed professions, and specifically attempted to prohibit, or at least 
burden, migration by imposing a labor-based head tax—essentially, free labor 
owed to local state projects—to each household at their initial place of 
registration.53 The reasons for this were complex, including concerns over state 
revenue, economic inequality, labor markets, and general social stability, but 
such policies were, in fact, standard practice in China until around 800 AD.54 The 
early Ming state made a serious effort at enforcing these labor taxes, but 
demographic and economic expansion, among other factors, eventually made 
enforcement increasingly costly. By the mid-Ming, circumvention of the head tax 
had become routine and relatively costless, which led to sharp increases in 
demographic mobility, and a corresponding rise in land selling.55 One could 
argue, of course, that the fundamental driving force in this process was economic 
and demographic growth but such an argument would nonetheless overlook the 
extent to which aggressive state prohibition and taxation likely depressed land 
market activity in the early Ming. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the twelfth to fifteenth centuries 
witnessed the decline of large aristocratic manors as a major source of 
agricultural production, gradually releasing large amounts of land into local 
markets.56 Until the Song Dynasty (960–1279), the dominant players in 
agricultural production tended to be large manors owned by titled aristocrats or 
high level literati, which were sustained, not so much by their economic 
superiority, but by the political privileges granted to their owners.57 As a number 
of scholars have documented, the political stature of these aristocratic families 
began to decline during the Song, and with this decline came the erosion of their 
economic position.58 Small, commoner producers, often much more motivated 
 
 53.  See generally Richard von Glahn, Ming Taizu Ex Nihilo?, 2007 MING STUD. 113 (2007) 
(discussing labor based taxes imposed by the first Ming emperor). 
 54.  The transition from a feudal system in which land sales were nominally prohibited to a free-
market system is one of the most important themes in medieval Chinese history. See, e.g., RICHARD VON 
GLAHN, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF CHINA: FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 208–
55 (2016); Hisayuki Miyakawa, An Outline of the Naitō Hypothesis and Its Effects on Japanese Studies of 
China, 14 FAR E. Q. 533 (1955). 
 55.  BROOK, supra note 52. 
 56.  VON GLAHN, supra note 54, at 273–95; Joseph P. McDermott, Charting Blank Spaces and 
Disputed Regions: The Problem of Sung Land Tenure, 44 J. ASIAN STUD. 13, 13 (1984). 
 57.  See sources cited supra note 54. 
 58.  See generally HILARY J. BEATTIE, LAND AND LINEAGE IN CHINA: A STUDY OF T’UNG-
CH’ENG COUNTY, ANHWEI, IN THE MING AND CH’ING DYNASTIES (1979) (tracing the evolution of elite 
families during from the late Song to the Qing); BEVERLY J. BOSSLER, POWERFUL RELATIONS: 
KINSHIP, STATUS, AND THE STATE IN SUNG CHINA (960–1279) (1998) (tracing the evolution of political 
elites during the Song); ROBERT P. HYMES, STATESMEN AND GENTLEMEN: THE ELITE OF FU-CHOU, 
CHIANG-HSI, IN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SUNG (1986) (tracing the evolution of Lower Yangtze 
gentry families during the Song); Robert M. Hartwell, Demographic, Political, and Social 
Transformations of China, 750–1550, 42 HARV. J. ASIATIC STUD. 365 (1982) (discussing the political 
changes that came with the transition from Tang to Song).  
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and economically nimble than the old aristocracy, gradually became the 
dominant force in agriculture.59 Their rise was not, however, a smooth one. In 
particular, the Yuan (1271–1368) and early Ming produced a new wave of major 
rural estates controlled by titled aristocrats and prominent gentry, who tended to 
benefit—relative to smallholders—from the sociopolitical upheaval created by 
Mongol conquest and retreat.60 The state, too, came to own enormous amounts 
of land through seizures and reclamation, and essentially managed these estates 
as an absentee landlord.61 From the early to mid-Ming, these large estates once 
again declined due to a combination of population growth and redistributionist 
government policies.62 In other words, it was probably not until the fifteenth or 
sixteenth centuries that aristocratic and political privilege gave way, for good, to 
the privatized, secure, and fluid system of landownership that characterized the 
Qing economy. More than any other factor, this is probably the most important 
long term factor that fueled the growth of Chinese land markets, in fits and starts, 
from Song to Yuan, and then to Ming. 
Not only do these explanations make moral economy theories unnecessary 
for understanding the early to mid-Ming growth in land selling, they actually 
provide positive reasons to be skeptical of them. Strong government control and 
extensive aristocratic landownership should have, at least in theory, worked 
against the creation of strong moral economies in land. In the traditional 
delineation of the theory, moral economies in land are the product of long-term, 
stable ownership.63 Landowners need both time and security to develop the kind 
of psychological—and, more importantly, moral—attachment that sustain moral 
economies. State intervention and aristocratic landownership presented 
significant challenges on both fronts. Tenants of major aristocratic manors were, 
of course, tenants, and therefore lacked secure ownership. Even freeholders 
probably felt less than fully in control of their property due to the presence of an 
intrusive state apparatus. Apart from encumbering migration and land selling, 
this system also periodically seized significant amounts of land via eminent 
domain.64 Chinese freeholders theoretically owned land at the sufferance of the 
emperor,65 against whom they had nothing resembling a constitutional right of 
secure property ownership. By later eras, especially by the Qing, the imperial 
state’s theoretical right of ownership had become almost purely nominal, but in 
 
 59.  See sources cited supra note 56. 
 60.  See LIANG GENGYAO, ZHONGGUO SHEHUI SHI [A HISTORY OF CHINESE SOCIETY] 246–47 
(2014). 
 61.  VON GLAHN, supra note 54, at 286–91 (analyzing impact of fiscal policy initiatives). 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  See, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 4. 
 64.  Lin Jinshu, Guanyu Mingdai Guantian de ji ge Wenti [A Few Questions about Ming State 
Landholding], 1988 ZHONGGUO JINGJISHI YANJIU [STUDIES ON CHINESE ECONOMIC HISTORY], no. 1, 
at 73. 
 65.  Mio Kishimoto, Property Rights, Land, and Law in Imperial China, in LAW AND LONG-TERM 
ECONOMIC CHANGE: A EURASIAN PERSPECTIVE 68, 71–73 (Debin Ma & Jan Luiten van Zanden eds., 
2011) (discussing the theory of king’s land, king’s people, as the land was believed to originally belong to 
the King or sovereign). 
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the early Ming it was much more imposing, and may have significantly diminished 
the sense of personal ownership that commoner households felt—and, 
correspondingly, the likelihood that significant moral economies could emerge.66 
These problems were, in all likelihood, even more acute in earlier dynasties. 
The Yuan (1271–1368) and Song (960–1279) contained substantially feudal rural 
economies dominated by large aristocratic estates rather than private farms.67 
Moreover, the imperial state was, in many ways, even more intrusive than the 
early Ming state. The Song state was known for taking a relatively laid-back 
approach towards land selling per se: unlike a number of regimes both before and 
after, the Song state never attempted to ban land sales or systemically curb land 
accumulation.68 That said, it also charged some of the highest land taxes in 
Chinese history and, from the late eleventh century to the thirteenth, attempted 
to micromanage agricultural production more intensively than any post–Tang 
Dynasty regime.69 In other words, the further back in time, the more likely that 
the average agricultural household would be a manorial tenant, rather than a 
landowner, and the stronger the state’s fiscal and regulatory presence would 
probably have been in everyday economic life. These trends suggest that 
significant moral economies did not exist in land. Correspondingly, explaining 
why Song and Yuan land markets tended to be less active than Ming and Qing 
markets—something that is difficult to prove empirically, but is nonetheless 
commonly assumed to be true70—can be done using these trends, rather than the 
assumed existence of moral economies in land. 
In sum, a chronological narrative of Chinese land markets would look 
something like the following: China began to transition out of a feudal land 
system around the tenth century. The process, which went through several 
dynasties and a variety of legal regimes, reached a critical point in the mid-Ming, 
after which commoner landowners truly became the dominant force in the rural 
economy. Prior to this point in time, there were two major factors—state 
intervention and aristocratic landownership—that not only made the existence 
of communal moral economies in land unlikely, but also rendered it analytically 
unnecessary. These factors provide far more persuasive explanations for any 
perceived lack of land selling in pre-Ming economies than does the moral 
economy theory. Land markets seemed to have advanced at more or less the 
same pace at which those factors receded. Therefore, barring the discovery of 
strong direct evidence of moral economies in land—and no such discovery has 
yet been made—there is very little reason to infer their existence from historical 
 
 66.  See discussion surrounding supra notes 53–55. 
 67.  See sources cited supra note 56 (discussing distribution of resources in economy).  
 68.   Yu Qianqian, Jiyu Boyilun de “Buyi Jianbing” Tudi Zhidu Fenxi [A Game-Theoretical Analysis 
of Song Dynasty Land Policy], 2007 ZHONGGUO JINGJISHI YANJIU [STUDIES ON CHINESE ECONOMIC 
HISTORY], no. 1, at 159. 
 69.  VON GLAHN, supra note 54, at 256–65, 268–69 (analyzing fiscal policy in the southern Song). 
 70.  Hu Gang, Ming Qing Tudi Shichanghua Qushi de Jiasu [The Acceleration of the Marketization 
of Land in the Ming and Qing], 2005 GU JIN NONGYE [AGRICULTURE IN ANCIENT AND MODERN 
TIMES], no. 2, at 88. 
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circumstances, and actually very good reason to infer the opposite. After the mid-
Ming turning point, however, reasonably compelling evidence of both highly 
active land markets and social commodification of land emerges. By the Qing and 
Republic, such evidence becomes quite overwhelming. In the end, it seems rather 
unlikely that moral economies, at least as traditionally defined, played a 
significant role in the history of Chinese land markets. Chinese land markets were 
indeed depressed or distorted for very long stretches of time—arguably for most 
of China’s documented history—but this was probably not the result of any 
widespread moral condemnation of land alienation. 
China is, of course, more than just a country or an economy by European 
standards. It is—and was—essentially an entire continent, a multiplex of 
ecologies and regional economies that, for most of their late imperial history, only 
loosely shared a unified political system.71 The apparent lack of significant moral 
economies in Chinese land management therefore provides more than just one 
data point. Nonetheless, one might wonder whether moral economies in land 
were more manifest in other major early modern powers. Part III considers a few 
of these, seeking to identify analytical comparisons or similarities. 
III 
BETTER LUCK ELSEWHERE? 
English history has probably been the arena where most battles over the 
moral economy thesis have been fought. Until the 1960s and 70s, the dominant 
theory in English social history, favored by prominent scholars such as R.H. 
Tawney and E.P. Thompson, was that England underwent a transformation from 
a collectivist moral economy to an individualistic commercial one: manor 
communities disintegrated, household farming rose to a position of prominence, 
and whatever traditional mores that bound farmers to certain customs against 
land alienation became obsolete.72 Correspondingly, land markets became 
unfrozen, and the alienability of land sharply increased both as a matter of law 
and as actual economic practice.73 Depending on one’s perspective, this could 
either be a positive development, one in which a pre-modern, irrational peasantry 
came to better utilize their landed resources,74 or a negative one, in which a moral 
peasantry lost the ability to engage in collective self-help and resistance against 
 
 71.  See JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 75–78 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing 
economic and ecologic compositions of macroregions in mid-Qing China); G. William Skinner, Regional 
Urbanization in Nineteenth-Century China, in THE CITY IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 211 (G. William 
Skinner ed., 1977).  
 72.  See generally R. H. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM (1926) (outlining the 
scope of this theory); R. H. TAWNEY, THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (1912) 
(detailing the beginning of this transformation); THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 97–184. 
 73.  See sources cited supra note 72. 
 74.  Weberian scholars, including Weber himself and others who worked to some extent in his 
tradition, such as Tawney, often bemoan the moral decline, but also tend to attribute early modern 
economic growth to it. See, e.g., TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 72; MAX 
WEBER, THE PROTESTANT WORK ETHIC AND THE “SPIRIT” OF CAPITALISM AND OTHER WRITINGS 
(Peter Baehr & Gordon C. Wells trans., Penguin Books 2002). 
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predatory aristocrats, gentry, and capitalists.75 Weberians and Marxists alike 
seemed to accept this basic narrative. 
The primary challenge came from studies of local sources: most famously, 
Alan Macfarlane’s 1978 book English Individualism proposed a radical 
reinterpretation based on local material from Earls Colne.76 First and foremost, 
he argued that there was really no legal or customary evidence of norms that 
forbid land selling.77 Instead, individual landowners were largely free to buy and 
sell without fear of moral or social condemnation. Second, he argued that the lack 
of moral prohibition freed landowners to engage in large numbers of land sales, 
leading to extremely active land markets even in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries.78 Only rarely did land remain in a single household for more than a few 
generations. Third, Macfarlane saw in these relatively narrow empirical claims a 
broader revision to English social history. Instead of transitioning from 
collectivism to individualism, he argued, English society was more likely to have 
been individualist all along—exceptionally so, when compared with continental 
societies.79 At no point in well-documented English history did social behavior 
significantly veer from an individualist ideal in which individuals pursued their 
own well-being without much regard for broader communal or even household 
welfare. 
Predictably, this radically revisionist history triggered an immense debate 
between supporters and detractors.80 After several decades of back-and-forth, 
controversy continued to swirl over some of Macfarlane’s claims, especially the 
more general ones, but consensus began to emerge around a few basic points. As 
a “description of rights,” wrote H.R. French and R.W. Hoyle in 2003, “English 
Individualism is surely accurate.”81 Even in medieval times, there were neither 
significant legal nor social constraints on land sale. Instead, “there was always a 
market in land, both freehold and leasehold,” and it was very common “for those 
who farmed the land to have no interest in it save their lease.”82 However, 
Macfarlane’s claim that land changed hands frequently in medieval times is on 
weaker ground. Archival evidence from Earls Colne, for example, suggest that 
land markets, while existent and functional, were not quite as active as he initially 
believed, and that land could often remain within a single household for several 
 
 75.  See THOMPSON, supra note 4 (describing the evolution of rights, or lack thereof, of the 
peasantry). 
 76.  ALAN MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM: THE FAMILY, PROPERTY, 
AND SOCIAL TRANSITION (1978). 
 77.  Id. at 62–130. 
 78.  Id. at 102–30. 
 79.  Id. at 165–89. 
 80.  See JANE WHITTLE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRARIAN CAPITALISM: LAND AND LABOUR IN 
NORFOLK, 1440–1580, 10–25 (2000) (discussing this debate); H. R. French & R. W. Hoyle, English 
Individualism Refuted and Reasserted: the Case of Earls Colne (Essex), 1550–1750, 56 ECON. HIST. REV. 
595, 595–96 (2003) (discussing the debate on English individualism).   
 81.  French & Hoyle, supra note 80, at 621.  
 82.  Id.  
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generations.83 There likely were institutional, political, or social reasons holding 
the land market back, even if moral condemnation of land alienation was not one 
of them. Finally, the notion that English society was fundamentally individualistic 
from a very early time has largely been accepted, especially in light of recent 
scholarship demonstrating substantial commercialization in medieval England.84 
Scholars have cast doubt, however, on Macfarlane’s characterization of 
socioeconomic individualism as a distinctively English feature, noting that the 
difference he attempts to draw between English and continental socioeconomic 
behavior was poorly documented.85 
Early modern Japanese history is another field where the moral economy 
narrative was once particularly ascendant. From the early Tokugawa to the Meiji 
era, there is a fairly well-documented process of rural communal disintegration 
and peasant displacement, which generated a symbiotic narrative of moral and 
social change.86 More recently, however, several scholars, most notably Mark 
Ramseyer, have challenged this narrative by demonstrating that economic 
resources, including both land and labor, once assumed to be inalienable under 
the early modern moral economy, were both institutionally alienable and 
frequently alienated.87 This was particularly true of land. The Tokugawa 
Shogunate actually outlawed the permanent selling and buying of land, but as 
Ramseyer and others have demonstrated, the ban was almost completely 
circumvented in local practice.88 Nearly all local villages recognized a form of fake 
ten-year mortgage that was essentially a permanent transaction—the debtor 
would simply default after ten years, thereby leaving full title to the creditor.89 
The high volume of land purchases made by richer farmers was one of the main 
reasons for the displacement of smallholders during the later Tokugawa.90 If 
anything, land alienability led to communal disintegration, rather than the other 
way around. 
  
 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  E.g., Ian Rush, The Impact of Commercialization in Early Fourteenth-Century England: Some 
Evidence from the Manors of Glastonbury Abbey, 49 AGRIC. HIST. REV. 123 (2001). 
 85.  H. R. FRENCH & R. W. HOYLE, THE CHARACTER OF ENGLISH RURAL SOCIETY: EARLS 
COLNE, 1550–1750 21 (2007) (“But nowhere in English Individualism is it demonstrated that the French 
peasant land markets operated any differently from English peasant land markets.”). 
 86.  See PENELOPE FRANCKS, RURAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN 96–97 (2006) 
(discussing Tokugawa and Meiji peasant movements); VLASTOS, supra note 4, at 1–20 (discussing 
Tokugawa peasant movements). 
 87.  See HERMAN OOMS, TOKUGAWA VILLAGE PRACTICE: CLASS, STATUS, POWER, LAW 222–42 
(1996) (deconstructing this concept on a more micro-level); J. MARK RAMSEYER, ODD MARKETS IN 
JAPANESE HISTORY 26 (1996) (calling into question the concept of land inalienability in Japanese 
history); Osamu Saito, Land, Labour and Market Forces in Tokugawa Japan, 24 CONTINUITY & 
CHANGE 169, 191 (2009) (applying this concept to Tukugawa market forces). 
 88.  See sources cited supra note 87. The Tokugawa Shogunate was the last feudal Japanese military 
government, and was in power from 1603 to 1867. 
 89.  See sources cited supra note 87. 
 90.  See, e.g., THOMAS C. SMITH, THE AGRARIAN ORIGINS OF MODERN JAPAN 157–64 (1959) 
(discussing the development of new class relations between large and small land landholders). 
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Even in Southeast Asian studies, the home field of James Scott’s landmark 
study The Moral Economy of the Peasant,91 moral economy theories have 
encountered significant skepticism. Scott’s work soon inspired Samuel Popkin to 
produce what could plausibly be called a counter-manuscript, The Rational 
Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam, which not only 
argued that Vietnamese peasants were far less moral and far more utilitarian and 
rational than Scott acknowledged, but also marshaled a wide array of sources 
from European and African history to argue against the presumption that the 
“morally irrational peasant” was a major historical phenomenon anywhere.92 
More specifically, Popkin also argues that Vietnamese landownership had a fairly 
high turnover rate well before the modern colonial era.93 
For now, the debate continues in many fields.94 This article has thus far 
attempted to show, however, that in several major economies—China in 
particular, but also England, and perhaps Japan—there is very little evidence that 
moral economies significantly burdened land markets at any stage of well-
documented history. Other factors may have burdened land markets, some 
demonstrably so, but moral aversion to land selling is a more empirically elusive 
creature. This should create, at the very least, a presumption against any knee-
jerk application of moral economy theories to explain pre-modern land market 
distortions. In fact, it might do more than that: barring overwhelming empirical 
evidence, any argument for why moral economies in land existed in other 
historical societies should ideally also explain why they existed in some parts of 
the world, but not others. If moral economies in land were not a universal 
phenomenon, then there should be a comparative theory that explains their 
emergence. 
The moral economy narratives examined here tend to share one major 
methodological defect that lends considerable credence to their opponents. For 
the most part, they do not consider alternative explanations for their empirical 
findings. In the Chinese case, for example, moral language employed in land 
contracts and litigation documents was all too often taken to be unproblematic 
evidence of moral economies—when it almost certainly was not. Political 
economy–based alternatives are rarely taken seriously in this literature, perhaps 
due to the methodological gaps between various branches of the social sciences, 
but ultimately to the field’s detriment. It makes it very difficult to be confident 
that the moral economies under discussion were truly moral, especially when so 
many of them eventually fail to withstand careful scrutiny. 
This brings up the question of burden of proof. If a historical phenomenon 
seems to lend itself to both a moral economy explanation and political economy 
 
 91.  SCOTT, supra note 4. 
 92.  See generally SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE RATIONAL PEASANT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
RURAL SOCIETY IN VIETNAM (1979). 
 93.  Id. at 83–132. 
 94.  Cf. TRIPP, supra note 4 (outlining how this debate continues to be important to the economic 
history of the Islamic world). 
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one, which side should bear the heavier burden? That is, which side should be 
responsible for making at least a prima facie case that the other side will likely 
fail to explain the phenomenon? In the specific context of land markets, the fact 
that moral economies apparently played no significant role in the documented 
history of several major socioeconomic systems may tilt the burden towards the 
moral economy camp, but nonetheless, one has to wonder if there are more 
systemic, theoretical reasons to think so. 
IV 
A (PARTIAL) THEORY OF EARLY MODERN LAND MARKETS 
This part provides a theoretical argument for why moral economy proponents 
should bear the burden of proof within the context of early modern land markets, 
which they have yet to meet in any compelling way. That is, until persuaded 
otherwise by the bulk of existing evidence, it should be presumed that there were 
no widespread moral economies in early modern societies that substantially 
burdened the alienation of land—not necessarily that there was no moral 
condemnation of land selling, but that such condemnation was not powerful 
enough to actually prevent most people from selling land when it was in their 
economic interests to do so. The basic argument is simple: the greater and more 
complex a resource’s economic value, the less likely that it will be subject to 
significant moral economies. Therefore, given the extremely high economic value 
of land in early modern societies, there should be a general presumption, subject 
to rebuttal, that early modern land markets were largely unfettered by the moral 
condemnation of land sales. For reasons explained in the Conclusion, this 
presumption does not necessarily apply to post-industrial societies. 
For a moral economy narrative to be truly distinct from a political economy 
one, there must be at least some element of subjective morality in the process, 
either via conscious normative internalization or through cognitive habit.95 
Otherwise, if so-called moral economies were merely equilibria of consciously 
utilitarian and materialist bargaining, they would be analytically 
indistinguishable from materialist political economies even if expressed in moral 
language, and therefore meaningless. There are two major kinds of subjective 
moral behavior that can avoid this problem. First, individuals might pursue a line 
of action due to conscious moral reasoning—a conscious decision to do, or not 
do, something because of a moral belief. Second, they might pursue that line of 
action out of subconscious habit, but, when forced to justify it, make sincerely 
moral arguments. One could argue that these processes are not necessarily 
inconsistent with utilitarian theories of microeconomic or political behavior. 
Internalized moral norms are merely part of one’s utility function, and influence 
behavior like any other personal preference.96 That may be true, but it would not 
 
 95.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4 (rejecting any suggestion that moral economies might simply 
be the expressive symptoms of political economy). 
 96.  Neoclassic versions of this assumption often assume utility functions to be exogenous. Cf. Gary 
S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON. 675 (1988) (outlining 
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negate the fundamental distinction between moral and materialist utilitarianism, 
in which economic gain is considered the primary motive. 
On a societal basis, there may be a tradeoff between moral and material 
economies concerning a given resource: the more important the latter, the less 
important the former—and vice versa. This will seem intuitive to most people. 
After all, we generally believe that our moral beliefs are more likely to be 
compromised when the economic costs of obeying them are higher. But are there 
more intellectually rigorous ways of delineating the argument? 
Fortunately, at least three major theories of cognitive behavior lend support 
to this argument. First, the system one/system two theory of cognitive 
decisionmaking that Daniel Kahneman and others have raised to prominence in 
recent years suggests that individuals reserve conscious thinking—“system two” 
or slow thinking—for only the most important decisions, whereas most decisions 
are made somewhat subconsciously using “system one” or fast thinking.97 Under 
this framework, the most salient decisions, the ones that command conscious 
intellectual effort, tend to be the most important and difficult ones. Applying this 
framework to the context of early modern land markets: whereas a farmer might 
employ system one thinking to quickly discard a piece of worthless wasteland, 
system two would most likely kick in if the land involved was critical to his 
livelihood. In other words, the cognitive salience of a decision—land selling, for 
example—should theoretically increase when its economic significance is 
extremely high. This reduces the likelihood that early modern land markets were 
regulated by subconscious moral habits. 
Second, a considerable body of psychological research—which goes back to 
Freud, Piaget, and Kohlberg, but remains influential today—argues that 
individuals tend to acquire their internalized normative preferences at a young 
age and that younger children tend to be more normatively malleable than older 
ones, and vastly more malleable than adults.98 In addition, the more economically 
 
a theory of rational addiction); George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 
67 AM. ECON. REV. 76 (1977) (analyzing taste, addiction, and exogenous preferences. But see David 
Krackhardt, Endogenous Preferences: A Structural Approach, in DEBATING RATIONALITY: 
NONRATIONAL ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING 239 (Jennifer J. Halpern & Robert 
N. Stern eds., 1998) (proposing a model of endogenous preferences over exogenous functions); Robert 
A. Pollak, Habit Formation and Dynamic Demand Functions, 78 J. POL. ECON. 745, 745–46 (1970) 
(formulating a model of consumer behavior based on habit formation).  
 97.  See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (delineating the 
outlines of this theory of cognitive decisionmaking). 
 98.  See, e.g., JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 13–108 (Marjorie Gabain 
trans., 1965) (developing this theory); see also LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL 
DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 409–12 (1981) (outlining six stages of moral 
development); RICHARD WOLLHEIM, SIGMUND FREUD 177–218 (1971); PARENTING AND CHILDREN’S 
INTERNALIZATION OF VALUES: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY THEORY (Joan E. Grusec & Leon 
Kuczynski eds., 1997) (discussing internalization of values and preferences by children); Joan E. Grusec 
& Jacqueline J. Goodnow, Impact of Parental Discipline Methods on the Child’s Internalization of Values: 
A Reconceptualization of Current Points of View, 30 DEV. PSYCHOL. 4 (1994); K.V. Roe, Early Empathy 
Development in Children and the Subsequent Internalization of Moral Values, 110 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 147 
(1980). For a more recent application of these ideas, see Amir N. Licht, Social Norms and the Law: Why 
Peoples Obey the Law, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 715, 733 (2008) (citing HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF 
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significant a resource, the less likely adults will entrust children with them. This 
is broadly true, in modern societies, of major decisions concerning finance and 
property,99 and there is little reason to believe that early modern societies were 
significantly different. Indeed, the early modern family patriarch generally held 
greater control over household socioeconomic decisions than any comparable 
figure in modern households, and children were rarely involved.100 Putting these 
arguments together, one would have at least some reason to be skeptical of moral 
economy–based theories of early modern land markets. As a general matter, 
individuals were probably only exposed to issues of land management and 
alienation at a fairly advanced age, well after their most cognitively malleable 
years. 
Third, a number of influential cognitive studies have shown that individuals 
are more likely to accept norms and beliefs that agree with their previously held 
dispositions and preferences.101 Assuming that most individuals, even children, 
have an innate and usually strong preference for material gratification and wealth 
accumulation, it would follow that an individual would likely have a harder time 
accepting—and therefore internalizing—norms that distinctly damage his or her 
economic interests. This is essentially a formal and theoretical way to express the 
aforementioned intuition that people are most likely to disobey moral 
commandments when the material cost of obedience is highest. 
Examples abound. Despite clear and severely worded moral commandments 
against wife and child selling in early modern China and Japan, violations were 
nonetheless so common among the poor that scholars have been able to identify 
what can only be described as mature and well-regulated markets for wives and 
children.102 In comparison, whatever moral stigma a land sale or purchase might 
have carried—and it is highly questionable whether they usually carried any—
was mild, whereas the economic importance of a land sale was generally much 
greater. In an agricultural economy, land, if well maintained, kept its value, 
whereas human labor rapidly lost value over time. Consequently, a parcel of land 
large enough to support one person was generally vastly more expensive than the 
 
LAW 193–278 (1989)). 
 99.  See, e.g., Haiyang Chen & Ronald P. Volpe, An Analysis of Personal Financial Literacy Among 
College Students, 7 FIN. SERVS. REV. 107, 114 (1998) (concluding that college students have poor financial 
literacy); Annamaria Lusardi et al., Financial Literacy Among the Young: Evidence and Implications for 
Consumer Policy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15352, 2009), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15352 [https://perma.cc/QH4H-DF4N] (indicating some consensus that this 
is true in contemporary populations).  
 100.  See, e.g., MACFARLANE, supra note 76 (discussing medieval and early modern household 
decision-making); Alexandra Shepard, Manhood, Credit and Patriarchy in Early Modern England, c. 
1580-1640, 167 PAST & PRESENT 75 (2000) (discussing social norms of patriarchy in Early Modern 
England). 
 101.  See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK RES. 147 
(2011) (explaining the scientific basis for this confirmation bias). 
 102.  See generally MATTHEW H. SOMMER, POLYANDRY AND WIFE-SELLING IN QING DYNASTY 
CHINA: SURVIVAL STRATEGIES AND JUDICIAL INTERVENTIONS (2015) (identifying the full scope of 
this market); RAMSEYER, supra note 87. 
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person himself.103 Having the ability to buy and sell land was, therefore, much 
more economically important than having the ability to buy and sell human 
beings. If an extremely explicit moral (and legal) prohibition was unable to stop 
the latter, then one can only wonder what kind of moral commandment would 
have been necessary to stop the former, and what kinds of extreme 
socioeconomic conditions could have created such a commandment. It is frankly 
more logical to assume, until proven otherwise, that they rarely existed. 
It is easy to imagine that socio–moral condemnation of land alienation 
benefitted, and therefore appealed to, certain individuals or groups, but vastly 
more difficult to imagine anything approaching a social consensus emerging in 
favor of such norms. Too many people would lose out under such a consensus, 
ranging from wealthier households looking to purchase land to desperate 
landowners in dire need of cash, to neighbors looking to make micro-adjustments 
to boundaries. Peasant households may very well have strongly preferred not to 
sell land, but that hardly meant that they did not want the freedom to do so. 
Government officials, on the other hand, may indeed have preferred to keep 
peasants locked in place—it made tax collection and administration much 
easier—but few scholars would accept elite political preferences or ideology as 
evidence of societal moral economies. Social consensus is, in the end, what a true 
moral economy narrative requires. It has to at least be strong enough to make 
dissidents fearful of reputational sanctions. But, more ideally, the deterrence 
against norm violation would simply be guilt. This analysis suggests that neither 
likely existed. 
What do these cognitive insights suggest about moral economies? To begin 
with, moral regulation is more likely to emerge over resources that are less 
cognitively salient and more likely to be seriously dealt with at a young age. 
Perhaps more importantly, the less the moral norms clash with individual 
economic interest, the greater their chance of taking root. Within the specific 
context of land markets, scholars have also proposed other conditions for their 
emergence—for example, that they usually emerge in response to long-term, 
sustained ownership over land, and that they tend to emerge in stable, close-knit 
communities104—but those conditions tend to be compatible with the arguments 
made here. Neither long-term, sustained ownership nor communal closeness 
implies extreme economic significance. In fact, they are quite unrelated. The only 
proposed condition that is distinctly incompatible is the somewhat common 
suggestion that the extremely high economic value of land in early modern 
societies actually aided the development of moral economies against land 
alienation.105 Not only is there no empirical support—within the confines of 
Chinese and English history—for such a claim, but its logic is probably 
backwards. The extremely high economic value of land in early modern societies 
 
 103.  SOMMER, supra note 102. 
 104.  See, e.g., POLANYI, supra note 4; SCOTT, supra note 4. 
 105.  See, e.g., HUANG, supra note 4, at 71 (characterizing Qing Dynasty land systems as driven by “a 
survival ethic”). 
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is, in theory, more likely to have worked against, not for, the emergence of such 
moral economies. 
In other words, by expending so much energy on land alienability in early 
modern economies, moral economy proponents likely picked one of the most 
inhospitable terrains conceivable to apply their theories. This may have been a 
conscious choice—it sometimes pays to tackle the hardest problems first—but 
more likely reflected a somewhat curious understanding of human psychology. A 
more conventional understanding suggests that, in the context of early modern 
land markets, the burden of proof should be higher for moral economy 
proponents than for their opponents. They have not satisfied this burden. 
V 
CONCLUSION: MORAL ECONOMIES IN OTHER CONTEXTS 
If most early modern societies were indeed morally tolerant of land 
alienation, does this negatively reflect on the empirical viability of moral 
economy theories in general? This is where the theoretical problems with pre-
industrial land markets discussed in parts II and III are actually beneficial for 
moral economy proponents. As a theoretical matter, robust evidence of early 
modern moral condemnation of land alienation should not have been expected 
in the first place. It is much better to encounter empirical difficulties with higher-
hanging theoretical fruit than with lower-hanging ones. 
But what, exactly, would be the lowest hanging fruit? It would likely involve 
social or economic resources that are relatively distant—at least as a matter of 
perception—from basic material livelihood and sustenance and draw serious 
individual engagement at relatively young ages. Moreover, they should ideally be 
managed and used over the long term by stable, close-knit communities. 
One potential concern is that such low-hanging fruit would necessarily be 
economically insignificant due to their relative distance from material 
sustenance. In other words, if moral economies only exist where they have very 
little socioeconomic impact, why study them at all? This, however, is a 
misunderstanding. The distance that really matters is a perceived one. Moral 
economies may very well exist over resources that seem somewhat distant from 
the economic livelihood of most individuals—and therefore do not trigger the 
kind of system two scrutiny106 and self-interested concerns that likely were 
triggered by early modern land sales—yet still have profound, if somewhat less 
direct, material consequences. 
To illustrate this point, the following paragraphs outline an example drawn 
from some of my previous work. It turns back to the mortgage redemption 
institutions discussed in part II, and seeks to provide a cultural—and, in many 
ways, moral—explanation for them that does not rely on conventional moral 
economy theories of land inalienability.107 Therefore, it demonstrates how moral 
 
 106.  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 97. 
 107.  See generally Taisu Zhang, Cultural Paradigms in Property Institutions, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 347 
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norms can impact land markets without directly commenting on the specific 
moral meaning of land sales. 
The dian sales that dominated the late imperial and Republican era Chinese 
land market were essentially a form of mortgage. They allowed landholders—
usually smallholders, who were more economically vulnerable and therefore 
more likely to engage in collateralized borrowing—to sell land to a creditor for 
some sixty to eighty percent of its full value while retaining a right of 
redemption.108 Compared to mortgage instruments in other early modern 
economies, dian sales gave an unusually strong right of redemption to debtors. 
Not only were debtors allowed to hold essentially unlimited rights of redemption, 
but under most local customs, this right mandatorily attached to all dian sales.109 
After the dian sale, the seller could, at any time, convert the dian sale into a 
permanent one, upon which he received an additional payment, generally equal 
to the difference between the original loan and the land’s full value, while 
surrendering his right to redeem. 
This arrangement tended to maximize the debtor’s ability to redeem his land, 
which, under early modern economic conditions, was usually highly desirable. 
This won it broad popularity and support among smallholders, who were much 
more likely to need to trade land for cash.110 At the same time, it severely 
hampered the ability of wealthier landowners—who tended to be the creditors in 
dian sales or the buyers in permanent ones—to securely acquire land, and 
therefore tended to draw their ire. In other words, dian redemption norms were 
an example of smallholders advancing their institutional preference despite 
significant opposition from their wealthier neighbors.111 
How did this happen? For the most part, it was a straightforward reflection 
of the political clout of smallholders. Unlike in, for example, early modern 
English and Japanese society, smallholders were surprisingly well represented 
among the political elite of most rural villages and towns.112 In some Northern 
Chinese villages, for example, below-average landholders could occupy half the 
positions on the village council, and a surprisingly large number of village heads 
were close to landless.113 On issues that were crucial to their economic 
livelihood—dian redemption almost certainly qualified because it directly 
affected the stability of their landownership—smallholders were therefore able 
to draw upon fairly substantial sociopolitical resources, and could sometimes win 
significant victories. In the specific context of dian redemption, evidence suggests 
that the intervention of lower income political elites in support of infinite 
 
(2016) (discussing how culturally defined social hierarchies influence the creation of property 
institutions).  
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 112.  Id. at 389–92. 
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redeemability was crucial to its institutional entrenchment.114 Without it, the 
opposition from large landowners would have been extremely difficult to 
overcome. 
But this begs the question of how smallholders came to hold such 
sociopolitical stature in the first place. After all, many, quite possibly most, other 
early modern societies tended to allocate status and power on the basis of wealth 
and therefore saw their local politics dominated by large landlords.115 Why were 
things different in China? The answer most likely lies in normative status 
hierarchies, the social norms of status distribution, which rural communities 
operated under. Late imperial and Republican Chinese society broadly embraced 
the Neo-Confucian social ideal that individuals should self-organize into large 
kinship networks, and that social rank within those networks should be 
determined by age and generational seniority.116 This allowed a number of low-
wealth but high-seniority individuals—most villages had a number of these—to 
obtain status and political influence quite disproportionate to their landholding. 
Moreover, the proliferation of these Neo-Confucian status hierarchies was at 
least partially a cultural or moral process of norm internalization. They spread 
from relatively constrained beginnings in the eleventh century to social 
predominance by the sixteenth or seventeenth largely because people believed 
that they were a morally desirable or natural means of social organization.117 
Socioeconomic and political incentives alone cannot satisfactorily explain this 
rapid expansion, largely because the socioeconomic or political benefits of 
establishing Confucian gerontocracies were profoundly ambiguous, and quite 
possibly negative in many circumstances.118 Without widespread societal 
internalization of such hierarchies—of which there is substantial evidence 
beginning in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries—it is hard to imagine how they 
came to dominate social life in virtually all parts of the Chinese core by the late 
Ming. 
In other words, there was a chain of causation from culturally internalized 
norms of status allocation to actual distributions of sociopolitical status, to the 
property institutions that emerged from bargaining between social groups of 
varying sociopolitical stature, and then to the distortions in the land market that 
were caused by these institutions. But why were status distribution norms morally 
internalized when norms against land alienability most likely were not? 
Returning to the basic theoretical framework outlined in part III, one could 
plausibly speculate that social hierarchies were both less directly linked to 
everyday economic life and far closer to the philosophical core of Neo-
Confucianism. In fact, there were enormous amounts of philosophical and ethical 
writings by intellectual and political elites at all levels that explicitly endorsed 
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these hierarchies, whereas there were very few that paid any attention to the issue 
of land alienation.119 Moreover, there is at least some basis to suspect that status 
criteria, by virtue of their extremely early introduction in the average person’s 
life—they are commonly believed to be some of the first norms that children are 
exposed to—may be more internalized than property norm preferences, which 
are generally not developed until many years later. In fact, status criteria are 
encountered and accepted so early in most people’s lives that, allowing for any 
possibility of non-self-interested norm internalization, they would probably be 
one of the most likely candidates. 
The lack of empirical support for moral economies of land selling does not, 
therefore, rule out the possibility—indeed the likelihood—that moral economies 
existed in other dimensions of socioeconomic life. These were true moral 
economies in the sense that they were moral norms that had, in the end, 
significant economic consequences. One might even call the kind of causation 
chain outlined above a moral economy of land selling, in that it describes a 
process by which moral norms affected the institutional framework and economic 
operation of land markets. It just was not a moral economy of land selling in the 
conventional sense, which focuses on the moral condemnation of land alienation 
per se. If moral economy theories are to regain their foothold in early modern 
history, they should discard that conventional perspective in favor of broader, 
more complex understandings of the relationship between moral norms and 
economic activity. 
A final question to consider is whether, and how, the above discussion can 
address the transition from early modern to modern that inspired most of the 
moral economy narratives of land alienability in the first place. Most scholars 
would agree that land markets in contemporary societies are generally more 
active and free than those in early modern societies.120 At the same time, at an 
individual level, the economic significance of landholding has often decreased, 
given that most households in developed countries, and an increasing share of 
households in developing countries, no longer rely on personal landholding for 
income. That is, the material obstacles that prevented the moralization of land 
alienation in early modern societies have now largely disappeared, but few moral 
economies, if any, have emerged in their absence. Is this a problem for the 
theoretical arguments made above? 
There is no reason to think so. The emergence of moral economies in land 
alienation can be affected by a number of factors, of which land’s economic 
significance is only one. Several of the other factors, including the geographical 
stability of individual landholders and the closeness of local communities, clearly 
work against the emergence of moral economies in the more mobile and 
commercialized modern era.121 Nonetheless, it is rather interesting to observe 
 
 119.  See generally id. at 347–414. 
 120.  Virtually all the historical scholarship cited in this paper, whether for or against the moral 
economy thesis, agree with this basic empirical assessment—they differ on how to explain it. 
 121.  See Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law 
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that the reasons why such moral economies failed to emerge in pre-modern and 
modern history are probably quite different. The same socioeconomic forces—
industrialization, capitalism, the development of a modern labor force—that 
decreased the importance of landholding also accelerated geographical mobility 
and the disintegration of local communities. Modern economic development 
giveth, but also taketh away. 
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